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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
TRADE LAW-IMPORT QUOTAS-EXECUTIVE AGENCY MAY IMPOSE TEXTILE
IMPORT QUOTAS UNDER SECTION 204 OF THE AGRICULTURAL ACT OF 1956
WITHOUT PRIOR SHOWING OF DOMESTIC MARKET DISRUPTION-
JURISDICTION- CUSTOMS COURT POSSESSES EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER
ACTIONS PROTESTING IMPORT QUOTAS
In 1973 the United States became a party to a multilateral agreement,
popularly known as the Multi-Fiber Agreement.' This compact governed
the imposition by member nations of tariff and nontariff barriers on cotton,
wool and man-made textile and apparel products.' Immediately thereafter,
the Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements (Commit-
tee),1 an executive agency composed of representatives from the Depart-
ments of State, Treasury, Labor, and Commerce, began to implement the
Multi-Fiber Agreement. The Committee, acting under the authority
granted to the President by section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956,1
negotiated and executed bilateral textile import quotas with those coun-
tries which accounted for the bulk of United States textile imports.'
On July 27, 1974, Consumers Union, a national, non-profit organization
which provides information and testing services for consumers,6 brought
suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Consumers Union
I Agreement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001,
T.I.A.S. No. 7840.
2 The Multi-Fiber Agreement provides a framework within which bilateral import quota
agreements can be negotiated. Its basic function is to provide an international legal system
for establishing quota agreements so that the agreements do not violate the principles of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.). GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 STAT. pt. 5, A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; see R.
HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 212 (1975).
3 Established by Executive Order 11651, 3A C.F.R. 152 (1973).
7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1970). Section 204 originally provided that:
The President may, whenever he determines such action appropriate, negotiate
with representatives of foreign governments in an effort to obtain agreements limit-
ing the export from such countries and the importation into the United States of
any agricultural commodity or product manufactured therefrom or textiles or tex-
tile products and the President is authorized to issue regulations governing the
entry or withdrawal from warehouses of any such commodity, product, textiles or
textile products to carry out any such agreement. 70 Stat. 200.
By the time of this action discussions had begun or had been announced between the
United States and the governments of Mexico, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Thailand, Taiwan,
Japan, Malaysia and South Korea. Brief for Appellant, at 8, Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc. v. Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, 561 F.2d 872 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant).
Most notably, Consumers Union publishes a monthly magazine, CONSUMER REPORTS,
which boasts a paid circulation of 2.2 million. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and
Mandatory Injunction, at 2, Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Committee for
the Implementation of Textile Agreements, No. 74-968 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 1977) (hereinafter
cited as Complaint).
.482
1978] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
alleged that the Committee had violated the procedural requirements of
section 204 in that it had failed to determine, prior to imposing the trade
restraints, whether the imports would result in potential or actual disrup-
tion of domestic markets.7 It further contended that in failing to publish
such findings the Committee had violated the rulemaking requirements for
executive agencies set out in sections 3 and 4 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA). s Consumers Union sought a declaratory judgment sus-
taining its allegations and a mandatory injunction directing the Commit-
tee to issue findings of domestic market disruption prior to initiating fur-
ther negotiations with foreign governments or imposing additional import
quotas.
At trial the Committee first challenged the jurisdiction of the district
court, arguing that all actions for relief from import quotas came within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Customs Court.' The Com-
mittee further asserted that its implementation of the textile quota pro-
gram was insulated from judicial review as an exercise of the President's
inherent power to conduct foreign relations.10 Accordingly, it moved for
judgment on the pleadings.
In the alternative, the Committee moved for summary judgment on the
two issues raised by Consumers Union. First, it argued that since section
204, on its face, granted the Executive unfettered discretion to determine
the appropriate circumstances under which import quotas would be im-
posed," there was no statutory basis for requiring a finding of domestic
I This "domestic market disruption" standard was derived from the legislative history of
section 204. See note 25 infra. Consumers Union also noted that the Multi-Fiber Agreement
required a showing of "domestic market disruption" prior to the imposition of unilateral
import restrictions. 25 U.S.T. 1001, 1017.
5 U.S.C. §§ 552-53 (1976). Section 3 requires federal agencies to make general information
about their composition, functions and procedures available to the public. Section 4 regulates
rule-making. Agencies are required to publicize rule-making proceedings, explain the legal
authority for the agency action, publish the rule when promulgated, and allow for oral and
written comment by interested parties.
I The Committee cited 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1970) as granting exclusive jurisdiction to the
Customs Court over Consumers Union's cause of action. The relevant portion of that statute
is set out in note 23 infra. Brief for Appellee, at 9, Consumers Union of the United States,
Inc. v. Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, 561 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee).
0 As concerns the source and nature of the power which it exercised, the Committee
insisted: (1) that its authority is in part derived from the President's constitutional power to
conduct foreign relations; (2) that section 204 constitutes congressional recognition and aug-
mentation of that power; and (3) that courts have traditionally refused to review discretionary
exercises of the President's constitutional authority. As a result, the Committee argued, its
activities were immunized from judicial review. Id. at 17.
The Committee cited the clause "whenever he [the President] deems such action appro-
priate," contained in section 204, as indicating that Congress intended that no constraints
be placed on Executive discretion. This congressional expression, it was urged, obviated the
necessity of deriving any additional standard for the exercise of section 204 authority from
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market disruption. The Committee summarily dismissed Consumers
Union's second contention, insisting that the Committee's rulemaking pro-
cesses fell within the well-established "foreign affairs" exemption to the
procedural requirements of the APA.' 2
In response to this assertion, Consumers Union filed a cross-motion for
partial summary judgment on its charge of violation of the APA require-
ments, insisting that the Committee's answer to that complaint raised no
material issue of fact.
Initially the district court found the jurisdiction of the court proper,
noting that not only was a consumer organization unable to file the protest
prerequisite to Customs Court jurisdiction, but also, assuming it were
permitted to do so, the Customs Court was not empowered to grant the
equitable relief requested.' 3 The court then proceeded to deny the Commit-
tee's motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that an executive action
taken pursuant to a congressional delegation of authority does not neces-
sarily invoke such inherent presidential powers as would insulate the ac-
tion from judicial review.'4 The court did, however, grant the Committee's
request for summary judgment, holding that section 204 decisions come
under the "foreign affairs" exception to the APA and that the Committee
was not required to make a determination of actual or potential market
disruption before imposing import restraints on textiles. 5 On appeal, held,
reversed on jurisdictional grounds alone. Exclusive jurisdiction over the
action lies with the Customs Court in its capacity to review protests di-
rected to the exclusion of goods by the customs service. Consumers Union
of the United States, Inc., v. Committee for the Implementation of Textile
Agreements, 561 F.2d 872, (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3582
(1978).
Under the United States Constitution, the power to regulate foreign
commerce is vested exclusively in Congress." Since the passage of the
Tariff Act of 1930, '1 Congress has delegated increasingly more of this power
the legislative history, and would certainly eliminate all grounds for judicial imposition of a
"domestic market disruption" requirement. Id. at 17, 22.
IS Section 4 of the APA exempts "military and foreign affairs functions" of the United
States government. See note 8 supra.
'. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Committee for the Implementation of
Textile Agreements, No. 74-968, at 1 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 1977) (hereinafter cited as Consumers
Union v. C.I.T.A.).
Id. at 5 n.12.
'5 Id. at 15.
" "The Congress shall have power . .. [t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations
.... "U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. "While there was disagreement over many portions of
the proposed Constitution, every version contained a section to the effect that Congress was
to have control over foreign commerce." Bassiouni & Landau, Presidential Discretion in
Foreign Trade and Its Effect on East-West Trade, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 494, 495 (1968).
'1 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1970).
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to the Executive. This trend seems to reflect a general belief that the
President, unlike Congress, is relatively immune from localized pressures
favoring strong import barriers. 9
The increasing complexity of international trade law may also have
encouraged Congress to delegate its responsibility for regulating foreign
commerce. Traditional legislative approaches such as unilateral trade bar-
riers frequently proved counterproductive, inviting reprisals by injured
competitor nations.2 0 Eventually, as the folly of unilateral action became
generally recognized, it was replaced by bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments, negotiated directly with affected foreign governments.2' Since Con-
gress itself was unable to conduct these negotiations, congressional delega-
tion to the Executive of its foreign commerce regulatory authority was
inevitable.
While the implementation of trade policy requires the President to uti-
lize functions-for example, negotiation with foreign govern-
ments-inherent to his power to conduct foreign relations, there is no
immediate reason why delegated policy-making authority should necessar-
ily invoke special executive powers." Thus, when Congress grants the Ex-
ecutive the authority to issue trade regulations, rather than merely to
adopt appropriate measures for their implementation, the Executive must
exercise this policy-making role in a manner consistent with the congres-
1 Four examples are: section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (1933), 7 U.S.C. § 612
(c) (1970); the Trade Agreements Act (1934), ch. 474, 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970); section 352 of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970); and the Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C. § 2132(a) (Supp. VII 1977).
11 This belief may well have lost some of its validity. During the autumn of 1977, the Carter
Administration attempted to steer through Congress a Maritime Cargo Preference bill
which would have cost consumers untold millions of dollars a year. The bill was defeated only
after a sustained publicity effort by a remarkable coalition of opponents ranging from Human
Events to Ralph Nader's Congress Watch. See, Ripon Forum, Nov. 15, 1977, at 1.
2' See Note, Presidential Authority in Foreign Trade: Voluntary Steel Import Quotas from
a Constitutional Perspective, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 179 (1974).
21 Id.
2 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Pillai v. CAB, 485 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1973). If
the delegated policy-making authority relates to an area of activity clearly within the Presi-
dent's constitutional power to conduct foreign relations, executive discretion cannot be lim-
ited by Congress or the courts. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (involving
executive agreements enacted in connection with the President's power to extend diplomatic
recognition to foreign governments); Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (involving the President's duty as Commander in Chief to protect
national security); South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d
622 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (also involving national security considerations). Otherwise, a congressional
delegation of authority is unconstitutional unless accompanied by some indication of legisla-
tive policy or purpose; "A constitutional delegation of powers requires that Congress enunci-
ate a policy or objective or give reasons for seeking the aid of the President." Star-Kist Foods,
Inc. v. United States, 275 F.2d 472, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1959). See also A.L.A. Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394 (1928).
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sional purpose indicated in the enabling legislation. 3
Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956 is an excellent example of the
type of congressional delegation of the power to regulate foreign commerce
which allows the Executive considerable control over policy-making. In
authorizing the President to negotiate and enact bilateral agreements re-
stricting textile imports, section 204 provides no express criteria linking
executive action to the existence of any special circumstances such as
domestic market disruptions. 2 The legislative history, however, is replete
with references to the threat textile imports pose to the profitability of the
domestic textile industry.25 The immediate rationale for section 204 seems
to have been to prevent low-cost American cotton, obtained through over-
seas discount sales of United States agricultural surpluses, 26 from reenter-
3 See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953) (invalidating an
executive agreement with Canada which contravened an act of Congress). Judicial review is
an essential policing device to ensure that Presidential exercise of delegated authority is
consistent with the legislative purpose:
The principle permitting delegation of legislative power if there has been sufficient
demarcation of the field to permit a judgment whether the agency has kept within
the legislative will, establishes a principle of accountability under which compati-
bility with the legislative design may be ascertained not only by Congress but by
the courts and the public.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO v. Connally,
337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971). Some authority suggests that executive action must be
examined even more closely for compatibility with the legislative purpose when the President
has, as here, transferred his delegated authority to an executive agency. Devito v. Schultz,
300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969). If Congress has failed to sufficiently circumscribe the scope
of permissible executive action, the courts may examine the context and surrounding circum-
stances of the statutory delegation and infer an appropriate standard. Lichter v. United
States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
24 Section 204 provides that the President may act to restrain imports "whenever he deems
such action appropriate." See note 4 supra. This type of wording is generally held to add little
to the meaning of a statute. "Nothing should hinge upon the presence or absence of such
vague phrases as 'public interest' or 'just and reasonable.' The substance is the same whether
Congress says 'deal with the problem' or says 'deal with the problem in the public interest'."
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 2.04, at 87 (1958).
z. See 102 CONG. REc. 7436 (1956) (remarks of Rep. Roberts):
[Ulnfortunately, the economic stability of this industry is being seriously jeopard-
ized by the tremendous increase in cotton textiles, largely from Japan, which re-
sulted from the 1955 tariff cuts. If action is not taken soon to give some relief to
our own textile industry, we may soon find that through excessively low tariffs and
lack of prudence we will have rendered useless our own textile industry ....
[Tihe textile industry alone cannot withstand the present deluge of cheap Japa-
nese textiles now inundating the American market.
See also 102 CONG. REC. 7447 (1956) (remarks of Rep. Deane): "... I am hearing from
millowners and operators in all sections of my district that the present rate of textile imports
into this country from Japan is having a very disastrous effect on our textile industry .... "
2A The House Report on section 204 (then listed as section 303) put the matter plainly:
This section is desirable in view of Section 302 (section 203 in the enacted bill),
which directs the disposal of stocks of agricultural commodities held by the Com-
modity Credit Corporation, and of the general policies of the Department of Agri-
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ing the country as under-priced textile products and thereby undermining
the very purpose of the Agricultural Act.
Construction of the scope of the authority granted the President under
section 204 is therefore inhibited by its somewhat contradictory charac-
ter-no restriction is placed upon the circumstances under which the Pres-
ident can act to restrain imports, but no potential circumstance for action
beyond the threat of domestic market disruption, is suggested in the legis-
lative history. If analysis of the legislative history behind section 204 re-
veals a congressional purpose of preventing domestic market disruption,
it would seem that a showing of market disruption should be required to
trigger executive action under section 204, despite the absence of clear
language in the statute imposing such a requirement.27 If, on the other
hand, administration of the quota program logically requires the President
to consider extrinsic foreign policy factors, then the broad discretionary
language of section 204 could be interpreted as a congressional invocation
of the President's own power to conduct foreign relations. In this circum-
stance, imposition of any standard for executive action would be inappro-
priate."'
Compounding this problem is the fact that executive agencies such as
the Committee are subject to procedural requirements beyond those estab-
lished by the enabling legislation.2" Sections 3 and 4 of the APA require
that prior to informal rulemaking, federal agencies must publish intended
rules and provide the general public an opportunity to comment. 0 Agency
culture under which surplus agricultural commodities are made available in world
markets at competitive prices which are generally below domestic price levels.
Unless there is some limitation on imports of products manufactured abroad from
our surpluses, the sales program may well defeat its own purpose of expanding the
total market for our agricultural products.
H.R. REP. No. 1986, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2257.
See also the remarks of Rep. Roberts on section 204: "... it is the intent of Congress that
the textile industry of the United States should not have its very life jeopardized by a deluge
of foreign goods manufactured from our own agricultural products sold in the world market
at competitive prices which are generally below domestic price levels." 102 CONG. REc. 7437
(1956).
27 See note 21 supra.
* See South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d 622 (Ct. Cl.
1964). If the President, through his power to conduct foreign relations, lawfully possesses
complete discretion to determine policy in pursuance of a congressional delegation of author-
ity, it is presumed that he acts consistently with the legislative purpose. Martin v. Mott, 25
U.S. 19 (12 Wheat.) (1827).
' Section 2(a) of the APA defines agencies subject to its provisions as all federal authori-
ties, with the exception of Congress, the courts, territorial governments, the District of Col-
umbia government, and authorities acting under certain specified statutes concerning mili-
tary and intelligence activities. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970). The Committee did not dispute that
it was an "agency" within the meaning of the statute.
' See note 8 supra.
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actions, however, which involve "foreign affairs functions of the United
States" are specifically exempted from these requirements. 1 The determi-
nation of whether an agency action falls within this exempted category has
proceeded on a case-by-case basis. Agency procedures are exempted if
prior announcement would inhibit or otherwise complicate the decision-
making process, particularly if the agency action involves consultations
with foreign governments.32 The failure of the Executive, when acting
under section 204, to provide public notice and opportunity to contest has
not yet been challenged. While the Executive has promulgated rules under
section 204 without adhering to APA procedures, in actual practice the
Committee has provided for public comment prior to imposing restraints.
3
Even assuming the above issues were capable of resolution, much uncer-
tainty still exists as to the proper forum for review of executive actions
taken pursuant to congressional delegation of authority to regulate im-
ports. The United States Customs Court possesses
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions instituted by any person whose pro-
test pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, has been denied, in
whole or in part, by the appropriate customs officer, where the administra-
tive decision, including the legality of all orders and findings entering into
the same, involve(s) . ..(4) the exclusion of merchandise from entry or
delivery under any provisions of the customs laws.3 1
The Customs Court, as a general rule, will not review actions challenging
such decisions until the challenge has been reviewed and denied by the
appropriate officer.331 The right to protest these decisions is available only
to importers or American manufacturers, producers or wholesalers bring-
ing textiles into the United States.3 1 In reviewing the challenges before it,
the Customs Court is not empowered to provide injunctive or declaratory
relief.:7
3' 5 U.S.C. § 553 (a)(1) (1976).
3 The phrase "foreign affairs functions" used here ... is not to be loosely inter-
preted to mean any function extending beyond the borders of the United States,
but only those "affairs" which so affect relations with other governments that, for
example, public rulemaking provisions would clearly provoke definitely undesirable
international consequences.
S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1945); see also, H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 23, reprinted in [19461 U.S. CODE CONG. Svc. 1195. An example of executive "foreign
affairs" activity held not to fall within the exemption is found in Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), where deportation proceedings of the State Department and
the Immigration and Naturalization Services were noted as subject to sections 3 and 4 of the
APA.
'- 39 Fed. Reg. 13307 (1974). The Committee's announcements inviting public comment
included a disclaimer of any intention to abandon its exemption under 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1970).
. Id.
36 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514, 1516 (1970).
11 "[lit has long been held .. .that this court is a court of limited and special jurisdiction
[Vol. 8:482
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Several statutory grounds exist for district court jurisdiction over actions
of parties aggrieved by congressional trade regulation,", but only in the
absence of Customs Court jurisdiction .3 While the APA provides an inde-
pendent ground for district court jurisdiction over complaints arising from
federal agency rule-making," an exception is made for discretionary
agency activities."
The district court initially declared that its jurisdiction over Consumers
Union's actions was proper. 2 In rejecting the Committee's 'contention of
exclusive Customs Court jurisdiction, the court noted that while the physi-
cal exclusion of goods at a United States port, a matter exclusively review-
able by the Customs Court, was a consequence of the Committee's enact-
ment of import quotas under section 204, the thrust of Consumers Union's
suit was a challenge to "the authority of the President of the United States
to enter into voluntary agreements with foreign nations, the effect of which
and without equitable jurisdiction." Cummins-Collins v. United States, 20 Cust. Ct. 93, 97
(1948).
1 In the case at bar, the applicable statutes are 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) (general jurisdic-
tion over the District of Columbia); 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) (jurisdiction over action arising
from an Act of Congress regulating commerce); and 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970) (mandamus
jurisdiction).
27 U.S.C. § 1340 (1970). The key issue here is whether the Customs Court must have
actual authority to assume jurisdiction over an action before district court jurisdiction is
divested. The Committee argued that potential Customs Court jurisdiction-jurisdiction over
a category of litigation within which the present action could be placed-was sufficient to
deprive the district court of its authority to hear the case. Under this standard, Consumers
Union's inability to file a customs protest and the Customs Court's lack of power to grant
equitable relief would not eliminhte the bar to district court jurisdiction. The Committee
reasoned that because an identical challenge to the Committee's activities brought by an
importer for money damages, would lie within the Customs Court's purview, the Customs
Court gains exclusive jurisdiction over all such actions no matter who the complainant. Just
last November, however, the Second Circuit held that, where practically speaking, the Cus-
toms Court lacked the power to hear a case, district court jurisdiction was created. In Sneaker
Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 46 U.S.L.W. 2278 (1977), a footwear retailer challenged the validity of
"Voluntary Restraint Agreements" negotiated with Korean and Taiwanese exporters under
the Trade Act of 1974. The court noted that because the foreign exporters were exposed to
mechanisms to enforce the agreements through civil and criminal sanctions in their own
countries, it was unlikely than an occasion would arise for domestic customs protests. Since
such protests were a prerequisite to Customs Court jurisdiction, the Second Circuit permitted
the district court to hear the case even though technically the Customs Court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the action. Under the Sneaker Circus rationale, Consumers Union
(whose opportunity to obtain review by the Customs Court is not currently possible) should
be able to bring its action before the district court.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
" 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).
42 Judge Gasch based district court jurisdiction upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), 28 U.S.C. §
1337 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). See note 38 supra. The court did not discuss
Consumers Union's alternative ground for jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction over federal agency
rulemaking determinations under the APA. See note 40 supra.
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is to limit their exports to the United States" (our emphasis)." The court
further noted that because the Executive action taken here involved both
negotiations with foreign governments and the regulation of commerce
with foreign nations, it could not be insulated from judicial review simply
by characterizing the Act as dealing only with foreign affairs. 4 On the
other hand, the court regarded this involvement of the President's power
to conduct foreign relations (following from section 204's express authori-
zation of negotiations with foreign governments), as virtually dispositive
of the case on the merits. An unusually broad delegation of authority is
permissible where the President's inherent powers are to be utilized."5
Since section 204 on its face places no restriction on the President's right
to determine the appropriateness of textile import quotas, the court
seemed to be implying that the Committee possessed unfettered discretion
to impose such quotas."
The court did not examine the legislative history of section 204 for ex-
11 The court treated the jurisdictional issue here as identical to that presented in Consum-
ers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), in which the present plaintiff challenged
the legality of "voluntary" agreements negotiated by the Secretary of State with representa-
tives of the Japanese steel industry limiting steel exports to the United States. The analogy
is questionable, since the basis for the court's refusal to grant relief in Kissinger was a
determination that the agreements at issue were not binding under domestic law.
11 The court remarked that "not every statute that deals however remotely with foreign
relations may qualify for such broad delegation. It is necessary to determine whether the
delegations involve the President's foreign affairs authority." Consumers Union v. C.I.T.A.,
supra note 13, at 8-9. Thus, it was recognized that broad delegation depended upon analysis
of those executive functions actually brought into play during implementation of a given
statute. But the court's determination that complete executive discretion was permissible was
not grounded upon any such analysis.
11 This principle, though well-settled, has produced no little confusion on application. It
originated in Justice Sutherland's unprecedented suggestion in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), that the President possessed inherent, extra-
constitutional authority over all foreign relations matters in his capacity as repository of
national sovereignty. Although later courts have shrunk from approving this potentially vola-
tile doctrine in full, see United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953)
(invalidating an executive agreement with Canada which directily contravened an act of
Congress), something remains of the notion that the President enjoys an unusual degree of
discretion in foreign affairs. Defendant here has advanced a modified version of the original
Curtiss-Wright doctrine, to wit, that when Congress delegates authority over foreign com-
merce, that authority "merges" with the President's inherent powers and serves to insulate
subsequent executive actions from judicial review. Brief for Appellee, supra note 9, at 17-23.
Defendant's position points to the primary difficulty with the law in this area: unless the
President possesses concurrent power to regulate foreign commerce, it is hard to understand
why a presumption of discretion should apply to functions beyond those expressly assigned
to the President by the Constitution. For a persuasive and highly critical analysis of the
Curtiss-Wright doctrine, see Berger, Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH.
L. REv. 1 (1972).
" The court cited the Curtiss-Wright line of cases for its crucial conclusion that the use of
"foreign relations" powers to regulate imports, though subject to delegation from Congress,
could be entirely discretionary. See note 45 supra.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
pressions of congressional policy from which a domestic market disruption
standard might be inferred. In accordance with its apparent feeling that
only an express statutory standard could operate to limit the Committee's
discretionary powers, the court did find it significant that Congress had an
opportunity to impose procedural requirements on the Executive's textile
import quota program in 1962 when section 204 was amended and failed
to do so.17 In further support of its position the court cited the dissent of
Judge Leventhal in Consumers Union v. Kissinger.4" It was the district
court's opinion that in Kissinger Judge Leventhal, a well-known critic of
unrestrained executive regulation of foreign commerce, had conceded that
section 204 was unique in the breadth of authority it delegated."
In response to Consumers Union's argument that failure to grant relief
in this case could result in the Committee abusing its discretionary author-
ity for political ends, the court suggested that under the international
dispute settlement mechanisms created by the Multi-Fiber Agreement any
such abuses would not go unremedied.5 " The court concluded by ruling,
without extended comment, that executive actions involving the Presi-
" The 1962 amendment authorized the President to enter into multi-lateral as well as
bilateral agreements. There are some indications in the 1962 legislative history that Congress
considered a "domestic market disruption" standard implicit to executive exercise of section
204 authority. A substitute amendment to section 204 offered by Senator Humphrey would
have replaced the wording "whenever he [the President] determines such action appropri-
ate" with "when in his judgment such imports seriously affect domestic producers." The
Humphrey amendment passed the Senate but was deleted in conference. Debate on the
amendment, however, did not touch upon the "seriously affect domestic producers" language,
but centered entirely upon the additional substitution of "shall" for "may" in the first
sentence of section 204. See 108 CONG. REc. 8654 (1962). It is quite apparent from a reading
of these debates that Congress did not imagine that the President would act under section
204 in the absence of domestic market disruption (an assumption which was probably justi-
fied at that time, given President Kennedy's well-known "free trade" propensities), but
rather feared that he would fail to act despite a well-established threat to domestic markets.
See also note 62 infra.
506 F.2d 136, 146 (1974) (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
4g Consumers Union v. C.I.T.A., supra note 13, at 12. See also Consumers Union v. Kissin-
ger, 506 F.2d 136, 146 (1974) (Leventhal, J., dissenting). In examining the various delegations
of congressional authority to regulate foreign commerce, Judge Leventhal noted that section
204 was the only delegation not accompanied by "mandatory procedural prerequisites." It
should be noted that Judge Leventhal was attempting to demonstrate that Congress, in
enacting the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, intended that the detailed procedural require-
ments of the Act would apply to all executive actions regulating foreign commerce not covered
by prior legislation-especially the "Voluntary Restraint Agreements" at issue in Kissinger.
Thus, it would appear reasonable to assume that, in the passage cited by the court, Judge
Leventhal was referring to the absence of express, mandatory procedural requirements such
as those set out in the Trade Expansion Act.
' The Multi-Fiber Agreement sets up a Textiles Committee (article 10) and a Textile
Surveillance Body (article 11) to adjudicate disputes between contracting nations. 25 U.S.T.
1001 at 1012-15 (1974). Unfortunately, only governments, not individuals, can carry protests
to these two bodies.
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dent's foreign relations powers come squarely within the "foreign affairs"
exemption of the APA.
The holding of the court of appeals, limited as it was to the question of
jurisdiction, added little to an analysis of the numerous issues raised at the
district court level. In an extremely brief opinion,5 ' the court ruled simply
that any challenge to the exclusion of goods from entry at United States
ports falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court.52 Since
import quotas effect such exclusion, they are "part of the customs law."
While the court of appeals did cite Yoshida International, Inc. v. United
States5:' and Western Dairy Products, Inc. v. United States54 as supportive
11 Much of the Court's opinion was devoted to dicta in which the court expressed "serious
doubts as to the standing of the Consumers Union to sue." 561 F.2d at 874. In its complaint,
Consumers Union alleged that the Committee's administration of textile import quotas in-
jured Consumers Union and its members "in their capacity as consumers." Complaint, supra
note 6, at 8. The district court, in ruling favorably for Consumers Union on the standing issue
focused upon the organization's annual purchase of $15,000 in textile products for testing
purposes. The court of appeals limiting its review of standing to this element of Consumers
Union's case, expressed doubt that import quotas really affected Consumers Union's product
testing program-especially since an exemption from the restrictions might have been al-
lowed by the Committee upon application. 561 F.2d at 874. Neither court discussed Consum-
ers Union's second ground for standing: its membership's status as consumers of textile
products. The Committee, in its brief before the court of appeals, asserted that Consumers
Union had not distinguished its injury from that of the general public. Brief for the Appellee,
supra note 9, at 14-16. The Committee's position amounts to a claim that consumer organiza-
tions can never achieve standing based simply upon injury to consumers. The "differentiation
of injury from the general public" criterion propounded by the Committee is not a mandatory
prerequisite for standing, but rather a factor to be considered in determining whether the
necessary "injury in fact" has been suffered by the plaintiff. Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). It is true that if the injury com-
plained of is so generalized as to be unascertainable, there is no "injury in fact." In the present
case, however, Consumers Union alleges an injury that can no longer be seriously doubted,
i.e., the effect of import quotas upon consumers. Once "injury in fact" is established, the fact
that Consumers Union's injuries "are shared by the many rather than the few does not make
them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process." Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972). In addition, the case for Consumers Union's standing is buttressed by
the fact that both the district and appellate courts for the District of Columbia have found
standing to seek relief from import quotas where Consumers Union was alleging injuries to
consumers similar to those alleged in the instant case. Consumers Union of the United States
v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds
sub nor, Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Consumers Union v.
Sawhill, 393 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1975).
52 561 F.2d at 874.
378 F. Supp. 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
Yoshida involved a challenge to the validity of the 10% import surcharge imposed by Presi-
dent Nixon in 1971. The President acted under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act
of 1934, ch. 474, 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970), which amended the Tariff Act of 1930 to allow the
President to suspend tariff reductions, returning tariffs to an earlier level. Plaintiff in Yoshida
contended, successfully, that the Trade Agreements Act did not permit the President to
establish an arbitrary tariff level between the suspended rate and the earlier rate. Yoshida is
questionable authority for exclusive Customs Court jurisdiction in the present case because:
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of the court's position, it did not note the particular relevance of either
case.
The court did deem it important to distinguish Consumers Union v.
Kissinger,"5 a case in which the District of Columbia District Court as-
sumed jurisdiction over an action challenging the legality of "Voluntary
Restraint Agreements" negotiated by the Secretary of State with Japanese
steel exporters. The appellate court argued that since the trade agreements
under attack in Kissinger were construed by that court as "not legally
binding" and thus not subject to implementation by the Customs Service,
there was no occasion for the protest prerequisite to Customs Court juris-
diction.-", Because the case could not be raised before the Customs Court,
district court jurisdiction was proper. However, in concluding, in the in-
stant case, that exclusive jurisdiction over the action lay with the Customs
Court, the appellate court made no mention of Consumers Union's alterna-
tive contention that Customs Court jurisdiction was precluded by both the
inability of consumer groups to file a protest with an appropriate customs
official and the Customs Court's own lack of authority to grant equitable
relief.
The district court's ruling on the merits, if ultimately sustained, would
establish section 204 as an unparalleled delegation of Congress' authority
to regulate foreign commerce.57 Deliberate judicial restraint in the face of
an unclear, contingency-laden statute might justify such a result, but the
court seemed to develop its decision as though the statute were unambi-
guous.
The court properly eschewed the mystification of presidential foreign
relations authority as advocated by the Committee in support of its motion
for judgment on the pleadings.51 Yet the court's determination that unless
Congress unmistakably limits its discretionary authority the Executive
may exercise unfettered discretion when acting pursuant to congressional
(1) it involved a tariff surcharge rather than import quotas, and (2) the President's authority
in Yoshida was derived from the Tariff Act of 1930, which explicitly provides for Customs
Court review.
11 373 F. Supp. 568 (Cust. Ct. 1974), af'd, 510 F.2d 376 (C.C.P.A. 1975). Plaintiff in
Western Dairies protested an action by the Customs Service placing an imported item within
a category restrained through a presidential proclamation. The relevance of Western Dairies
to the present case is doubtful; plaintiff there did not challenge the President's authority to
restrain the imports in question, but rather alleged that the customs service had mistakenly
classified an item as within the restricted category.
- 506 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
" See Note, note 20 supra.
11 Comparison of the proposed interpretation of section 204 with the procedural provisions
of the Trade Act of 1974 is instructive. Sections 201-203 of that Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253
(Supp. IV 1974), require a prior finding by the International Trade Commission that
"increased imports have been a substantial cause of serious injury or a threat thereof with
respect to an industry" before the President can act to restrict imports.
- See note 45 supra.
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delegation of authority in any sphere related to foreign affairs, ultimately
relies on the same sort of mystification. There seems to be no reason to fear
that the "domestic market disruption" standard sought by Consumers
Union would in any way affect the Committee's exercise of foreign relations
activities. The finding of "domestic market disruption" would operate as
a threshold determination, one made prior to the initiation of negotiations
or the imposition of binding import restraints, that some rational justifica-
tion for proposed quotas exists in view of domestic economic circumstan-
ces.5 ' Subsequent consideration of international political or economic fac-
tors by the Committee, to determine the appropriate timing or precise
extent of restraints to be imposed, would not be inhibited. Should emer-
gency quotas become necessary to protect national security or to relieve a
severe balance of payments deficit, other statutory grants of authority are
already available.6 '
Moreover, the court was free to fashion a remedy so limited as to pre-
clude entirely any interference with "foreign relations" considerations. The
required finding could have been restricted to a simple yes-or-no determi-
nation of market disruption by the Committee. But the court apparently
felt that any series of executive actions which included negotiations with
foreign nations or the weighing of factors extrinsic to domestic impact, fell
within the category of "foreign relations" activities and carried with it a
presumption of extraordinary executive discretion. This notion is accepta-
ble if some concurrent, inherent executive power to regulate foreign com-
merce is triggered whenever foreign relations activities occur. But in reject-
ing the Committee's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court spe-
cifically denied that executive action pursuant to a congressional delega-
tion of authority could ever be characterized as proceeding from the Presi-
dent's inherent powers in the "foreign relations" sphere.6'
When Congress enacted section 204, it was clearly concerned with the
threat of "cheap Japanese imports" disrupting domestic textile markets. 2
In its cursory treatment of the legislative history behind section 204 the
only evidence the district court could find to confirm its analysis of section
204 was a remark by Senator Cotton, who was supporting a 1962 amend-
ment to section 204, that the President's power is "unbridled. '63 But Cot-
ton, who like most Senators could not foresee the day when Presidents
might be more protectionist than Congress, was referring to the President's
' Complaint, supra note 6, at 9-10.
' Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1970), the President can
restrain imports threatening the national security. The Trade Act of 1974 provided the Presi-
dent the means to impose an import surcharge where imports contribute to a serious balance
of payments deficit. 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
" See note 12 supra.
62 See 102 CONG. REc. 7436 (1956). See note 25 supra.
' 102 CONG. REC. 8522 (1962).
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power to refrain from acting under section 204, despite compelling domes-
tic need. " The court's implication that Congress, in its wisdom, desired
that the President be free to impose costly and cumbersome import quotas
for "foreign policy" purposes is unfounded in the legislative history of
section 204.
The district court was correct in finding that Executive actions which
qualified for the "foreign affairs" exemption from the APA were generally
coextensive with those proceeding from the President's foreign relations
powers. As indicated earlier, a functional analysis of the Committee's pro-
cedures reveals that the requirement of a prior finding of "domestic market
disruption" would not inhibit or unduly burden the activities of the Execu-
tive. Furthermore, the APA allows suspension of its publication require-
ments when there is some special need for secrecy or hasty decision-
making.15
Turning to the opinion of the court of appeals, its advice that "... if
anyone wishes to challenge the Committee's action, he can do so as other
challenges of that nature are made, i.e., as an importer or as an American
manufacturer, producer or wholesaler, bringing textiles into the United
States,"" is of little solace to a consumer group. This limitation effectively
denies consumers any forum to challenge the administration of import
quota programs, even though such programs cost consumers millions of
dollars each year in higher prices. "7
Admittedly Congress would be well-advised to amend the Tariff Act of
1930 to allow consumer groups to protest customs determinations; but this
deficiency in the customs law should not preclude assumption of jurisdic-
11 This interpretation is supported by examining the remarks made by Senator Cotton
immediately following the sentence quoted by the court:
I cannot forecast what interpretation may be given the provisions of this bill or
the law it amends by the President's legal advisors, or should the occasion arise,
by the courts. However, it seems to me from reading this section of the law, that
the President in securing a reduction of imports in one category could, in the same
agreement, and as a consideration for the concession, relax import restrictions in
other categories.
Let me say frankly that I find this aspect of the bill disquieting.
102 CONG. REC. 8522 (1962).
Cotton, a fervent supporter of textile import quotas, apparently feared that President
Kennedy might, during international negotiations, trade off textile restrictions for agricul-
tural quotas (the latter also under the President's control through section 204). Cotton's fears
were probably motivated by two substitute amendments to section 204 offered by Senators
Mundt and Humphrey which would have encouraged the President to obtain restrictions on
certain agricultural products.
65 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1970).
561 F.2d 874.
67 The General Accounting Office estimates that textile import quotas cost consumers
$356,000,000 in higher prices during 1972 alone. GENEJA ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND
FOREIGN POLICY EFFECTS OF VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS ON TEXTILES AND STEEL, 26
(Mar. 24, 1974).
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tion by a court where, as here, no other forum is available.
Moreover, the conclusion of the court of appeals that this action comes
within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the Customs Court is
highly questionable. Were Consumers Union challenging a substantive
determination by the Committee that imports from a given country should
be restricted, the action would clearly relate to the exclusion of goods by
the Customs Service and jurisdiction would reside with the Customs Court
alone. But here Consumers Union was alleging that the Committee had
exceeded its authority by failing to adopt procedures before any substan-
tive determination to negotiate or impose import quotas was made.
Finally, no precedent is available for placing within the exclusive juris-
diction of the Customs Court an action alleging violations occurring prior
to any exclusion of goods, and which seeks relief beyond the powers of the
Customs Court by a group which cannot protest determinations of the
Customs Service. The decision by the court of appeals constitutes a refusal
to exercise the court's mandated responsibility of judicial review.
K. Edwin Kilgore
